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Even the most attentive and patient student feels over-
come by the volume of Husserl’s output. As a basic 
teaching need, there is a demand for concretely written, 
easily readable texts. Lecturers hope to have texts that 
they can cite for students and say, “Read this chapter, it 
gives a concrete overview of the whole thing I have just 
been talking to you about”. The difficulty in appraising 
Husserl concerns how to make a narrative about a 
perspective that is so complex and multifaceted. The 
detailed analyses Husserl provided can, on occasion, be 
very tangible descriptions. And yet there are reams of 
writings that talk about the difference between living in 
everyday experience, as opposed to theorising it in the 
psychological or transcendental attitudes that were clear 
to the author but not to his audience. The problems for 
anyone wanting to get a good grasp of Husserl’s original 
writings are many. I will name a few. 
Edmund Husserl wrote like a man possessed, and, given 
his arcane style and the fact that he was open to changing 
his mind, there is need for clarity. Among the problems 
of concluding on what Husserl meant, the entire output, 
the Nachlass, was written over a period of approximately 
50 years. Many of the manuscripts are fragmentary and 
written as a means of recording his own thinking, seem-
ingly only for himself. They are writerly texts rather than 
lectures. This is why it is refreshing to find a few concrete 
examples in works like Thing and Space (Husserl, 1907/ 
1997) and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Know-
ledge (Husserl, 1907/2008), where he expressed himself 
in clear, tangible ways. 
Furthermore, there are varieties of conclusions about the 
practice of Husserl’s methods. This leads to two problems 
that are more central. Firstly, Husserl attracted many 
followers, and phenomenology was, and still is, a genu-
inely radical movement because of its promise. However, 
anyone who uses “phenomenology”, and wants to justify 
an approach, claims to have genuinely understood the 
methodology and manner of analysis for concluding on 
ideals. Husserl’s phenomenology maps or models human 
encounters and the sense contained therein. It is a self-
conscious theoretical enterprise at one level. At other 
levels, it involves the practices of awareness, reflection 
on and analysis of one’s own lived experience, and paying 
attention to the lived experiences of social wholes of 
other people. It produces idealised sociality as theoretical 
constructs to wield. Importantly, Husserl’s influence 
attracted followers – but many took issue with some 
aspect of his perspective and manner of writing. 
Secondly, where this leaves all who read Husserl and 
phenomenology in its various forms, is with a sense of 
keen interest in the analysis of qualitatively meaningful 
social and personal experiences – and yet there is a grand 
confusion about how this could be achieved, leading to 
what could be called “justification anxiety” in qualitative 
research. This anxiety is relieved by expert commentary 
from persons properly qualified. If this were not to be 
received, then criticisms of Husserl or phenomenology 
would be inaccurate and irrelevant, since the criticisms 
made bore no relation to the original project. If persons 
wish to take inspiration from Husserl and phenomenology 
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and develop their approach in some way, then that is 
their right as free thinkers and actors. However, the 
fundamental question remains: What are the original 
methods and standpoints of Husserl, and how are they 
justified? – or not? – with respect to the evidence that 
we all have as human beings about what consciousness 
is and how it fits into the contemporary social world. 
 
If it were humanly possible to have read and digested 
the entirety of the Nachlass and conclude on it in a short 
space, then that would be a text worth reading. Next best 
would be texts from experts who can draw conclu-
sions, set a context for Husserl’s output, and go as far as 
suggesting improvements to make Husserl’s methods 
and position more cohesive. Husserl’s Phenomenology 
of Intersubjectivity is such a text that works to inform 
the phenomenological community by means of critical 
comments that identify some key aspects of what is 
important in the original project. The worth of Husserl’s 
Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpre-
tations and Contemporary Applications is that 15 chapters 
by leading scholars is a sound introduction for the 
novice and expert alike that provides concrete guidance 
on some key aspects of Husserl’s mission. In the review 
that follows, I will not comment on every chapter, but 
I will comment on some that seem most noteworthy for 
educational purposes. In addition, while I am making 
this aside, I will make apologies for not commenting on 
all 15 chapters and also for omitting other more complex 
matters that could be commented on in relation to this 
scholarly work. 
 
Christian Beyer supplies a chapter on motivation as 
part of epistemic rationality. In the psychological scope, 
the term “constitution” is usually used to make a 
narrative about experience. The social context of the life-
world is due to social acts of all kinds. In holistic view, 
the other means of expressing, in writing or dialogue, the 
same situation is that of “intentional analysis of given-
ness”. These are different ways of expressing the same 
focus on constitution, as shared active structuring of the 
conditions of possibility for intersubjectivity. There are 
many aspects to the whole that Husserl was identifying, 
and he wrote in a manner that demands demonstration 
and dialogue with the author, to get the details about what 
was being theorised, and what the conclusions are. Beyer 
points out that, in accruing learning, the sediments laid 
down are the trace of childhood and past learning, in a 
way that contemporary psychologists would describe as 
the effects of attachment and early learning. Individuals 
have their habits and skills maintained across the life-
span. The habits and knowledge we each have as indivi-
duals are the products of our upbringing. 
 
Beyer concludes by staying close to Husserl’s texts and 
citing passages where the perspectives of self and other 
become entwined, such that the sharing of the sense of 
cultural objects is what is passed between people. To 
empathise pre-reflexively, before egoic analysis begins, 
is to participate in the social world. Only in ideal conclu-
sions, in works like Cartesian Meditations (Husserl, 
1931/1977), did Husserl conclude that the perspectives 
of self and other on cultural objects are amalgamated 
across time, for everyone. The social learning theory is 
a theoretical idealisation that is self-conscious of its own 
manner of creation. The point of Beyer’s chapter is to 
focus on epistemic standards of justification in the 
analysis of social learning. The complicated theoretical 
stance is born of a desire to be self-reflexive. 
 
Søren Overgaard provides some definitive comments on 
empathy, the window that monads have on other monads 
and social encounters. He wants to distinguish between 
subtly different senses that Husserl identified regarding 
what it is to understand other people and human social 
contexts. Overgaard writes that, following Edith Stein 
(1917/1989), empathy is not emotional contagion or 
confluence, but rather concerns a felt-sense of connection 
that includes doing, living, feeling and deciding with 
others. The full extent of what Husserl wanted theorists 
to empathise with were not just other people in face-to-
face encounters in the social world, but also animals and 
possibly even foetal life in utero. In concluding on what 
makes the difference between authentic and inauthentic 
empathy, Overgaard concludes that person A empathises 
with person B if, and only if, two conditions are met. The 
first condition is that A does experience in imagination 
the contents of the other’s perspective as it is undergone 
from his or her point of view, sometimes referred to as 
“the other remains other” in a different but equivalent 
wording. The second condition for A empathising B is 
that A does not confuse A’s identity with B’s identity, 
or anyone else’s, in a sense requiring further specification. 
Overgaard concludes that the point of Husserl’s critique 
of Lipps was to prevent the discourse of projection-based 
accounts of empathy – for instance, like those made by 
Sigmund Freud. 
 
Two more chapters that are noteworthy contain further 
comment on the type of science a Husserlian perspective 
makes. The respective chapters are provided by Mirja 
Hartimo, “On the Origins of Scientific Objectivity”, and 
Harald Wiltsche, “Models, Science and Intersubjectivity”.  
 
Hartimo begins with an account of the cultural life-
world of lived experience. Hartimo concludes on “The 
Origin of Geometry” (Husserl, 1935/1970) as a leading 
text for understanding intentional history that draws out 
some key aspects of Husserl’s historical perspective. 
Given that the contents of society are transmitted from 
generation to generation across the centuries, objectivity 
across history is exemplified by the intentional analysis 
of geometry, reading and writing since their inception. 
Thus, writing is an exemplar for other types of know-
ledge acquisition. She concludes on the purpose of the 
transcendental approach to natural science as being 
that of finding the limits, scope and boundary conditions 
of theorizing attitudes of approach to regions of essence. 
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The point is to see that guiding concepts and relationships 
between them, and their regions, relate to practising 
science as it is lived by a scientific community, somewhat 
like Thomas Kuhn’s (1962/1996) approach to philosophy 
of science. 
 
Wiltsche focuses on sedimentation and formalization as 
topics of self-justification, meta-theoretically, in the 
exemplar of geometry that is passed on across the gene-
rations. His point is that the creation of mathematical 
models in science is the use of exact essences. The work 
done in creating the models is often unconsidered in 
philosophical critiques of science. The use of mathematics 
is intersubjective, in that it includes generations of 
mathematicians, and that is a condition of the possibility 
of science. Thus, science is not just intersubjective in 
that it requires replication by cohorts of other scientists, 
but in that its mathematical tools are also intersubjective 
in the work they do. 
 
However, if there were to be just one reason for buying 
Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity, then it 
would be to get guidance from Iso Kern, the editor of 
Husserliana XIII, XIV and XV (Husserl, 1973a, 1973b, 
1973c). In a 90 page opening chapter, Kern provides 
guidance on seeing essences as part of eidetic imagi-
native variation and works to make Husserl’s position 
more cohesive. Kern provides 29 sections on key aspects 
of empathy and intersubjectivity. What is novel is that 
Kern stresses that love and sex are part of the evidence 
of the manifold ways in which human beings are 
experientially given to each other. Husserl was interested 
in empirical, biological and developmental approaches 
such as those termed attachment relationships. This is 
because, like empathy, they are forms of relating through 
which the other makes himself or herself known and is 
given. Kern notes that, in sex, the other’s pleasure is a 
shared mutual goal, and this mutuality makes a unity 
occur. Sex is a mutual satisfaction and co-achievement 
of the sexual and attachment drive, although only the 
case of heterosexuality is considered. Two people in 
love can give each other negative feedback in a positive 
manner. Kern comments with authority on multiple 
aspects of the key points of how mutuality and reciprocity 
occur in all possible forms of interaction between self 
and other. In love, the loving self participates in the 
desire of the other. In a loving family, for instance, the 
aims of others are shared, so that circular co-constitution 
exists between people in love, so that shared aims can 
include positive and negative outcomes. In loving social 
contexts, people understand each other. Husserl’s ambi-
tion for his psychology had different scopes and contexts 
and included analysing actual relationships and social 
contexts in general, so that maladaptive forms of relating 
can be studied also. 
 
An important work by Eduard Marbach, a one-time 
student of Jean Piaget, makes it clear that it is both 
necessary and acceptable for Husserl to substitute findings 
from natural science and natural psychological science, 
as long as they have been formulated into intentional 
processes to safeguard their meaning for lived experience 
in a social whole, a social phenomenon. Marbach’s 
chapter on Husserl’s genetic method makes it clear that 
deconstructive imaginative variation can work on given-
ness and accept empirical findings from developmental 
psychology, for instance. The point of the exercise is 
to create an applied or empirical phenomenology by 
formulating or interpreting findings from outside of 
phenomenology, and forge ahead in creating theoretical 
support for practical psychological work and research. In 
child development research, eidetic imaginative variation 
could, for instance, be employed to study the stages of 
infancy and re-interpret the changes in children’s abilities 
from birth onwards. 
 
David Woodruff Smith provides a concise overview of 
Husserl’s project in one chapter to sum up key aspects 
of intersubjectivity and its cultural objects. It gives an 
overview of the all-inclusive nature of Husserl’s analyses 
of social wholes, social phenomena, either as specific 
real occurrences, or as modelling, mapping or theorizing 
lived experiences in general. Smith walks through inter-
subjectivity as it was analysed by Husserl from 1905 to 
1935 approximately. He characterises a part of Husserl’s 
conclusions as the importance of indexical semantics 
or logic of how social wholes are comprised around 
the actual perspectives of “I”, “other I”, “we” and “our 
cultural lifeworld”. The object of attention was understood 
in a style that has many influences. One is the Berlin 
School of Gestalt psychology. 
 
The basic social situation for Husserl concerned embodied 
consciousness, which is capable of receiving manifold 
senses of the same cultural object. The methods of reflec-
tion, analysis, and imaginative seeing of possibilities and 
actualities concerning face-to-face human encounters, 
differentiate between constant and variable moments of 
their whole. Through processes of social learning since 
childhood, people build up stereotypes about categories 
of things, ideas and people, generally and specifically, 
so that they come to know how to navigate social and 
geographical space. Smith spells out those sections in 
Ideas II (Husserl, 1952/1989) that provide an overview 
of ideal sociality. 
 
The importance of bodily expression as understandable 
through empathy is stressed. This conclusion is made, 
but without drawing out the consequences of this type 
of a conclusion, although Smith makes a brief aside to 
Edith Stein’s PhD thesis in which she explored the 
dimension of the emotional lives of others. Smith’s aside 
to Stein is helpful, because, in Stein’s work, the basic 
human encounter is expressed in brief. Whilst Stein’s 
manner of writing is different, her short work is roughly 
equivalent to Husserl’s, where a minimal social whole is 
being idealised. Edith Stein’s contribution (1917/1989) 
is the inclusion of emotions and gendered personality 
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in gendered social space in relation to the incorporation 
of the sexed body into phenomenology. 
 
Smith’s chapter concludes on how social spaces as extant 
- and designated in language by the words “I”, “you”, 
“this”, “she”, “he”, “they” – and the processes of inter-
connection between them as lived experiences of others, 
are the ideal conclusions that Husserl sought. Husserl’s 
treatment was of actual social wholes (face-to-face social 
encounters) and also social wholes of any sort; and, 
separately still, the means of mapping social encounters 
across a number of his manners of interpretation and his 
methods. When I write “social wholes”, I am referring 
to how meaning is social with respect to self, other, and 
anyone, about the cultural objects of which they are 
aware. 
 
While the perspectives of others, their intentions and 
motivations, were always what Husserl had wanted his 
psychology and philosophy to capture, it is the centrality 
of the expressive human body as nonverbal communi-
cation that is basic in it. Bodies continually signal their 
participation in the cultural world. The phenomenon of 
empathy is overlooked in the natural attitude; it’s just 
everyday chitchat and social interaction, or watching TV, 
or listening to radio, and being immersed in the moment. 
Only on starting reflection does it become possible for 
the ego to compare how social wholes differ and share 
similarities, in their parts and wholes of various sorts. 
 
The type of ideal theoretical or philosophical psychology 
that Edmund Husserl urged is a developmental social 
psychology, which needs further qualification in the 
scope and manner of its theoretical processes. Its style 
emphasises interdisciplinarity between biological, social 
and psychological human sciences of ever increasing 
contextual sizes. Its scope extends towards historical and 
even archaeological contexts. One aspect of it focuses on 
the first acquisition of abilities in childhood and there-
after, developmentally. It is a focus on meaning like 
Gestalt, but in a developmental social learning perspective 
also, somewhat like Jean Piaget, social constructionism 
or radical constructivism, but with numerous intricate 
explanations and qualifications of its scope and nature 
that defy sound-bite definitions. The scope of Husserl’s 
psychology further includes the analysis of references or 
associations that go far beyond individual differences 
and intentional sociology, and extends to the point of an 
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